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On 22-23 November 2016, the Department of Politics and International Studies 
(PAIS) at the University of Warwick hosted a lively conference on research ‘impact’, 
a key component of the Research Excellence Framework (REF) – the periodic peer 
review in UK Higher Education to evaluate the quality of academic work, in turn 
determining how nearly £2 billion of annual research funding is allocated among 
competing institutions. In contrast to many other conferences and workshops about 
impact, a feature of REF that has generated much fevered commentary across the 
university sector about the public value of academic research, our event was tightly 
focused on impact as it relates to the discipline of Politics and International Studies. 
Featuring presentations from a range of academic and non-academic constituencies – 
including journalists, government officials, and representatives from the Higher 
Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE),† the creator and (at the time of 
writing) controller of the REF – conversation was particularly timely, owing to the 
                                                        
* We are grateful to the following colleagues for their constructive feedback on drafts of this article: 
Richard J. Aldrich, Ben Clift, Steve Kettell, Nick Vaughan-Williams, and Matthew Watson. All errors 
remain the responsibility of the authors.  
† On 1 January 2018, the Office for Students (OfS) will replace HEFCE as the main regulator of higher 
education, which presumably will mean that the OfS will be the body that assumes the responsibilities for 
REF. All references in the text are nevertheless to HEFCE because that was the administering authority at 
the time that this article was written.  
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publication, a few months earlier, of the eagerly-awaited Stern Review on the future 
of university research assessment. This special issue contains selected papers from the 
conference, with the goal of shedding light on how the discipline as a whole, but also 
its varied composite parts, are responding to the impact agenda in the lead up to 
REF2021, now looming close on the horizon. We are grateful to the contributors for 
their participation and for opening up many new facets to the ongoing dialogue about 
impact.  
By way of an introduction, we would like to sketch out some of the most pertinent 
issues and challenges faced by political scientists amidst the new landscape of having 
to demonstrate the wider relevance of their research beyond academia. Several 
arguments will be advanced. One: Politics and International Studies is not inherently 
opposed to the basic premise of impact; indeed, we might even go as far as to say that 
an instinct for impact is in the disciplinary DNA. Created by leading figures in 
Progressive era thought, the discipline has long been moved by a utilitarian desire to 
produce knowledge that can enlighten and inform society for the greater public 
benefit. Notwithstanding a period in the second half of the twentieth century when 
disciplinary professionalization led to a degree of detachment behind the walls of the 
Ivory Tower, political scientists do not readily conform to the popular stereotype of 
the ‘begowned dilettante cossetted from the concerns of the real world’ (Lawson and 
Sayers, 2016: 17). They are, and always have been, what Colin Hay describes as 
‘public goods providers’ (Hay, 2015: 51).  
Two: owing to its disciplinary heritage, the primary debate for political science has 
not been whether impact should be done – a question that has delighted and divided 
many of its scholarly brothers and sisters – but whether impact, as presently defined, 
helps or hinders the discipline in its efforts to provide practical knowledge for the 
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public good. Here, political scientists are concerned that HEFCE has set the bar too 
high. As conceived, excellence in impact requires tangible evidence of research 
leading to direct change, with a high premium put on influence in the policy realm. 
Believing that this is an unrealistic target, political scientists have called for more 
emphasis to be placed on tangible knowledge transfer.  
Three: the discipline is blazing a trail in thinking about what Matthew Flinders has 
called the ‘Politics of Impact’. Increasingly, as they walk the corridors of power and 
attempt to juggle the world of public affairs, political scientists are realising that the 
impact agenda carries with it some delicate ethical issues and thorny professional 
dilemmas. HEFCE understands impact as research that has effected, changed, or 
benefitted society, but avoids specifying what qualifies as a positive or benign 
transformation. Notions of the ‘public good’ or the ‘public interest’ are, of course, 
contested and slippery – like trying to capture air. But, they are also political in a way 
that one suspects HEFCE did not foresee. Take, for example, a body of academic 
research that paves the way for better universal healthcare. On the majority of 
University campuses this would be held as an unqualified societal benefit. Elsewhere, 
however, in say conservative circles that desire lower taxes or a greater proportion of 
public funds to be spent on defence and national security, this would not necessarily 
be welcome. What this example underscores, albeit somewhat crudely, is that society 
is not homogenous in the way that the current model of impact presupposes: rather, it 
is made up of subgroups, each with different histories, identities, cultures, and 
expectations of what should constitute the public good. Ethically, therefore, political 
scientists are entitled to ask whether all ‘impacts’ should be valued the same and 
whether the pursuit of certain stakeholder relationships, while expedient for the 
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purposes of REF impact, constitute a Faustian bargain, not necessarily advancing the 
type of society that they themselves, as citizens, wish to see established.  
 
The ‘Special Function’ of Political Science 
Looking holistically at the political science community in the UK, we would suggest 
that there has not been the same level of ideological hostility to the notion of impact 
exhibited by other quarters of the academic profession. Typically, that opposition 
stems from the view that impact represents further evidence of the corrosion of 
academic freedom and agency by neoliberal forces determined to impose market-like 
discipline on universities and see them become Taylorist factories of knowledge mass 
production (Watermeyer, 2016; Chubb et al, 2017). Already drowning in a cascade of 
processes, reviews, and achievement indicators, it is held that impact is yet another 
unnecessary and exhausting burden on academics, with the added danger that they 
will be placed on a dreaded performance improvement plan, or even fired, if they do 
not prove their worth. Among critics, a terrifying picture has been painted of jaded 
academics marching to the drum of bean-counting ‘research managers’, parcelling out 
vulgarised versions of their marketised products like door-to-door salesmen 
(Pettigrew, 2011: 348), and urgently Tweeting about their research to a legion of 
online followers, in an exercise of self-promotion described sarcastically as the 
‘Kardashian Index’ (Hall, 2014). 
With a few notable exceptions – Andrew Vincent, for example, has warned of 
academics hurrying from the lecture theatre into television studios, in what he fears 
will be the scholarly equivalent of ‘Celebrity Come Dancing’ (Vincent, 2015: 481) – 
political science has not been an echo chamber for this kind of debate. Judging by 
conversations in leading conferences and periodicals, including this one, it is apparent 
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that there is a broad-based acceptance within the discipline of the need for a more 
visible and engaged political science (Flinders, 2013a; Campbell and Childs, 2013; 
Mhurchú et al, 2017). To quote the editors of a recent volume on the subject: ‘a 
discipline that studied politics but had nothing to say to those involved in politics or 
who might be involved would be failing’ (Stoker et al, 2015: 220). On the question of 
whether impact carries forward a neoliberal or monetarist agenda, reducing research 
to a series of performative investments expected to produce a financial return (Chubb, 
et al, 2017: 557.), political scientists have exhibited some interest and offered their 
opinion, but these conversations typically take place around the departmental coffee 
station or water cooler rather than in academic journals. In short – unlike, say, 
academics in education – it has not been one of their chief scholarly concerns. 
Operating from the position that academic knowledge should look to advance broader 
societal goals and political purposes, of greater interest has been the matter of 
operationalization and whether the impact agenda, as currently conceived by HEFCE, 
allows for and rewards the type of positive contributions to public life that the 
discipline seeks to achieve. 
It is not surprising, we would argue, that political science is more open-minded about 
the basic principle of socially useful scholarship than some other disciplines. Let us 
take this current section to consider and contextualise this. Current REF 
instrumentalities are but a moment in a long discussion within political science about 
its role and value beyond the Ivory Tower (Farr, 1988). Taking many twists and turns, 
this discussion started at the beginning of the twentieth century with the birth of 
political science as an academic discipline, often linked to the creation in December 
1903 of the American Political Science Association (APSA), the premier professional 
association in the field.  
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In the United States, the link between political science and the policy world was 
championed from the outset. At APSA’s inaugural conference in New Orleans, its 
founders argued for an engaged scholarship that sought to foster social and political 
reform along broadly Progressive lines, and they welcomed the prospect of 
practitioners treading the boards in lecture halls. Between the world wars, the belief in 
political science as a vital lubricant of democracy and democratic values was 
unshakeable, fortified by disciplinary giants like Abbott Lawrence Lowell, Frank 
Goodnow, and Woodrow Wilson, whom were leading lights in the Progressive 
movement, as well as scholar-activists like Radcliffe College Professor Sarah 
Wambaugh who campaigned for universal suffrage. An expert on plebiscites, 
Wambaugh planned and supervised a range of plebiscites internationally, and was one 
of the few female technical experts to the League of Nations Secretariat (Sluga, 2006: 
107). At the 1943 APSA meeting President William Anderson proudly referred to the 
‘special function’ of political scientists to ‘give whatever we can of our knowledge 
and counsel when called upon by responsible public officials’ (Anderson, 1943: 10). 
Political scientists, he stressed, had an obligation as scientists to understand and 
explain government, but also a ‘public responsibility’ as citizens to ‘see 
improvements made, to see rights and freedom enlarged’ (Anderson, 1943: 6, 7). In 
1954 APSA President Ralph Bunche rhapsodised about the ‘assistance of the 
profession’ in responding to requests from government departments (Bunche, 1954: 
963). In 1959, the International Studies Association (ISA) was founded in part as a 
mechanism to facilitate conversations between scholars and practitioners, specifically 
officials working in the United Nations and in the US agencies of State, Defense, and 
intelligence (Teune, 1982). 
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In the UK, while not institutionalised or pursued to the same degree of theological 
intensity as in the US, it is important to recognise that, here too, applied political 
science was an important feature of the nascent political science profession. This was 
evident, for example, in the immediate aftermath of the First World War with the 
creation of the Department of International Politics at the University College of 
Wales, Aberystwyth, tasked as it was with studying the problem of war and of trying 
to enhance understanding between nations as a means of preventing future conflicts. 
During the first half of the twentieth century many of the discipline’s key figures were 
actively involved in London-based politics and public affairs, staffing senior 
committees, attending consultative bodies, and even contributing to party programmes 
and manifestos. As Dennis Kavanagh has written, they rejected the notion of value-
free political science and described themselves as ‘social engineers’, providing 
practical knowledge and wisdom to the country’s leadership to help reform society 
(Kavanagh, 2003: 610). As they saw it, a professorial chair was a privileged platform 
from which to voice their opinions with the goal of influencing political processes for 
the public benefit. In short, it was for standing not sitting on.  
William George Stewart Adams, the first holder of the Gladstone Chair in Political 
Theory and Institutions at the University of Oxford (1912-33), had been a member of 
David Lloyd George’s personal secretariat, editing the reports of the War Cabinet, 
and from December 1916 to 1918 served as one of the Prime Minister’s trusted 
private secretaries (Harrison, 2004). Arthur Salter, his successor at the Gladstone 
Chair (1934-44), was a Conservative MP for more than a decade and worked for four 
years in Winston Churchill’s War Cabinet (Rickett, 2004). Harold Laski, Professor of 
Political Theory at the London School of Economics from 1926 to 1950, was one of 
the most influential thinkers and strategists in the Labour Party during the inter-war 
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years, and was Party chairman from 1945-6. W.J.M. “Bill” Mackenzie, builder of 
Manchester University’s famous Department of Government in the 1950s, and widely 
regarded as one of the discipline’s main architects in Britain during its post-war years 
of expansion, was a constitutional adviser to the new states of Tanganyika and Kenya 
and sat on various local and regional government committees during the premiership 
of Harold Wilson (Kavanagh, 1996; Kenny, 2004). Prior to this, he was part of the 
dons’ invasion into Whitehall during the war, even penning a Top Secret history of 
the Special Operations Executive (SOE). In addition to their direct role in 
government, figures like Laski and Mackenzie were public intellectuals who exerted 
more diffuse influence over the climate of political opinion by speaking on the radio, 
giving public lectures, as well as writing for newspapers, magazines, and the agenda-
setting publications of the intelligentsia (Kavanagh, 2003: 610). In modern parlance, 
we would call them ‘impact champions’. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, however, on both sides of the Atlantic, the discipline’s 
passion for knowledge transfer beyond the academy noticeably waned amid concerns 
not too dissimilar to those expressed today in relation to REF impact. The driver for 
this was twofold. One, during this period the discipline became methodologically 
fixated on the ‘Temple of Science’, which it regarded as key to achieving greater 
professionalization and legitimacy within the modern university system. As Robert 
Putnam has argued, with the emphasis on scientific rigor, statisticians, and the joys of 
micro-specialisation, public relevance became synonymous with the ‘dumbing down’ 
of knowledge, intellectual brand-building, and the hawking of wares normally 
practiced by celebrities and sports stars. Accordingly, it took a back seat (Putnam, 
2003). Elsewhere, paraphrasing Russell Jacoby, Ernest L. Boyer has described the 
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process of professionalization that started in the 1960s as relocating intellectuals from 
the urban coffee shop to the campus cafeteria (Boyer, 1996: 19).  
The second factor that led the discipline to participate less vigorously in broader 
public discourse was the fear that political science and government had become too 
enmeshed, to the extent that the study of politics risked becoming politicised. During 
this period, there were widespread revelations in the press about the coziness of 
certain intellectuals and student groups with national security actors like the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), fuelling suspicion that government was calling the tune to 
which academia waltzes (Wilford, 2008). Believing the integrity of the discipline to 
be at risk from the whims and arbitrary dogma of government, the reaction of many 
political scientists was to recoil altogether from practitioner relations. In short, they 
no longer walked on both sides of the street. 
However, the withdrawal from the public sphere proved self-harming and did not last. 
By the 1990s, it had become apparent that despite setting out with good intentions, the 
vaunted imperative to professionalise had resulted in the discipline becoming too 
esoteric and jargon-laden, fluent in a dry private language only accessible by its peers; 
too aloof and withdrawn behind a curtain of rational choice and formal modelling; too 
self-referential; too enamoured with the sheer aesthetic pleasure of knowledge for 
knowledge’s sake; and, so the harshest critics contended, too consumed by the navel-
gazing, narcissism and toe-to-toe conceptual combat of the sub-discipline of political 
theory (Shapiro, 2002). As Matthew Flinders has noted, the shift toward micro-
specialisation had encouraged a generation of thinkers who behaved less like ‘foxes’, 
eager to leave their particular intellectual domain to observe and comment on the 
world outside, and more like ‘hedgehogs’, anxious to tend their patch and, to quote 
Joseph Nye, know ‘more and more about less and less’ (Flinders, 2013a: 164; Nye, 
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2009). As a result, the discipline was accused of marching down the ‘road to 
irrelevance’ (Flinders, 2013b: 2), disconnected from the world’s most pressing social, 
economic, and civic problems, perfectly summed up by the title of David Ricci’s 1984 
book, The Tragedy of Political Science (Ricci, 1984). 
Concerned about the perception of irrelevance – the scholarly equivalent of the kiss of 
death – household names within the discipline used their status as a bully pulpit to 
advocate for political science to rediscover its ‘special function’. Evoking the spirit of 
the discipline’s founding fathers, Samuel Huntington used his APSA presidential 
address in 1988 to argue that ‘works in the social sciences should be judged not only 
on their intellectual merit but also by the contributions they make to achieving moral 
purposes’, adding that it was the moral responsibility of political science to promote 
what Roland Pennock (1966) called ‘political goods’ such as social justice, well-
being, order, liberty, peace among nations, and responsible government (Huntington, 
1988). Drawing on his own work on social capital and political participation, Robert 
Putnam used his APSA address in 2002 to argue that scientific rigor and public 
relevance, far from being opposing virtues or antithetical, were mutually supportive. 
Pouring cold water on the sniffy suggestion that relevance undermined academic 
complexity and standards, he explained that political scientists who leave ‘the 
congenial ivory-covered tower’ for the ‘hurly-burly of the public square’ actually up-
skill rather than dumb down, since communicating difficult subject matter in terms 
that different audiences can understand was an art in itself (Putnam, 2003: 252). Like 
Huntington, he also referred to the genes of the discipline’s parentage, insisting that 
‘an important and underappreciated part of our professional responsibility is to engage 
with our fellow citizens in deliberation about their political concerns, broadly defined’ 
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(Putnam, 2003: 249). Contributing to the public weal, he emphasised, should not be 
an ‘afterword’ or ‘optional add-on’: it was a core function of the discipline. 
In the US, this message was given further impetus by the so-called ‘Perestroika’ 
movement. Established in 2000 and emanating from the grassroots of the political 
science community, the movement criticised a perceived stranglehold on the 
discipline by quantitative and rational choice approaches (Monroe, 2005). Such 
‘methodological totalitarianism’, its followers claimed, meant that the best tenured 
jobs and top peer-reviewed journals, like APSA’s flagship, the American Political 
Science Review, were out of reach for anyone who dared to be different. Worse, it had 
insulated the discipline and robbed it of passion and purpose. According to the 
Perestroikans, as they came to be known, conspicuous by wearing red buttons at 
conferences as a show of solidarity, greater methodological pluralism was essential if 
the discipline wanted to reconnect with wider audiences, since those engaged in 
politics either as policymakers or citizens tended to favour less technical and more 
accessible modes of scholarship (Stoker, Peters, and Pierre, 2015: 10).  
In the UK, the campaign to promote a more relevant and purposive discipline was led 
to a large extent by the Political Studies Association (PSA). In 2000, to celebrate its 
fiftieth anniversary, it handed out one-off Lifetime Achievements Awards to six 
individuals who warranted the distinction of being one of the most influential political 
scientists since the Second World War. In a symbolic move, among the select group 
was Bernard Crick (Jeffery, 2009: 464), a scholar who stood in the honourable 
tradition of the publicly-concerned intellectual. Published in the first decade of his 
career, his classic works – The American Science of Politics (1959); In Defence of 
Politics (1962); and The Reform of Parliament (1964) – had warned about modelling 
the study of politics methodologically upon the natural sciences, describing abstract 
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theories and neutral scientism as a ‘bleak and barren world’ (Crick, 1959: 208), and 
championed the integration of political theory and political practice (Hayward, 1991: 
310). In 1964, with Michael Rye (Senior Clerk in the House of Commons), he had co-
founded the ‘Study of Parliament Group’, bringing together civil servants and 
researchers to make proposals on parliamentary reform. By acknowledging Crick’s 
contribution, the PSA was signalling to the profession that applied research had its 
place.  
While not without its opponents, efforts in the 1990s and 2000s to promote a more 
outward looking political science ensured that when impact was thrust upon the 
discipline for the purpose of REF, to some extent it was knocking on an open door. 
Evidence of this could be found in the creation of journals dedicated to 
communicating research to wider stakeholders including students, teachers, and 
policymakers. In 2003, for example, in the service of fostering what it called a 
‘political science public sphere’, APSA chartered a new journal, Perspectives on 
Politics, as a space for broad and synthetic discussion between the profession and 
wider reading publics on topics of real public relevance. In 2010, the PSA followed 
suit with the launch of the magazine Political Insight. It also gives prizes in the name 
of pioneering citizen-scholars Mackenzie and Crick. Because of the struggles waged 
by the coalition of Perestroikans, senior figures like Putnam, and bodies such as PSA, 
arguing forcefully that rigor and relevance can coexist, REF impact did not suddenly 
plunge the discipline into some sort of existential crisis or showdown with itself. 
Although it would be wrong to suggest that political science was unique among the 
disciplines in this respect, it is tempting to conclude that political scientists needed 
less convincing about why impact was important – for this battle had already been 
fought and hard-won – meaning that they could focus more quickly on what impact 
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could be achieved, and how, and to what extent HEFCE parameters prove cooperative 
or constraining.  
 
REFlections 
HEFCE understands impact as research that has had ‘an effect on, change or benefit 
to the economy, society, culture, public policy or services, health, the environment or 
quality of life, beyond academia’ (REF 2012). For the purpose of REF, academics are 
asked to encapsulate and evidence their impact on private, public or third sector 
domains in structured narrative case studies, which are assessed by expert panels that 
grade them on a scale of one to four star against the twin criteria of ‘reach’ and 
‘significance’. For REF2021, departments will be required to submit a minimum of 2 
case studies for up to 15 Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) staff, with one additional case 
study for each further 15 FTE returned (REF 2017/04). In the last REF, it has been 
calculated that a top-rated 4* case study was worth as much as £324,000 over a five-
year period (Reed and Kerridge, 2017).    
One of the greatest challenges presented by HEFCE’s conceptualisation of impact is 
the requirement that case studies need to provide obvious and ‘auditable’ evidence of 
published research directly changing the behaviour or actions of external 
stakeholders. Across the discipline of political science, this has been met with 
concern, with Patrick Dunleavy claiming that HEFCE is ‘asking for the moon’ in 
terms of what academics can achieve (Dunleavy, 2012), unrealistically equating them 
with philosopher-kings. Certainly, this is not what Putnam envisioned when he called 
for a greater public presence for political science. More modest in ambition, his vision 
was of a discipline that brought fresh perspectives into the policy arena; pricked 
bubbles; reduced groupthink by playing devil’s advocate; and challenged 
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conventional wisdom by adducing facts and elucidating values. ‘The most important 
contribution that political science might make to public life consists not in answering 
questions currently being asked’, he outlined, ‘but in framing new questions. Our role 
is to highlight ignored values, and to explicate the underlying logic that links facts and 
values’ (Putnam, 2003: 251). In other words, ‘impactful’ political science was more 
about the conversation pursued than the consequences achieved. 
Reservations about HEFCE’s definition of what constitutes impact are derived from a 
deep understanding of the policy-making process and the extent to which academia 
(and different forms of research) can realistically penetrate this world. Underpinning 
HEFCE’s model is an assumption of linearity: it is based on the belief that academics 
will diagnose a problem; design and evaluate a solution; publish that solution; and 
then effortlessly communicate it to grateful, rational, policymakers who will make 
discernible adjustments for the public good based on the intervention (Flinders, 
2013a: 153; Mhurchú et al, 2017). However, as political scientists know only too 
well, the real world does not always work this way.  
Firstly, HEFCE presupposes that direct change on policy can be achieved by a 
conscious and planned set of actions, when experience shows that a temporal dynamic 
exists, meaning that serendipitous external factors over which the academic has little 
control is often the key determinant of what allows research findings to resonate with 
policy agendas (Stoker, 2015: 20; Pettigrew, 2011: 350). For example, the scholar of 
international relations who studies the North Korean nuclear programme would 
presumably be of greater interest to American defence officials today than, say, in 
2003 when Iraqi WMDs topped the Pentagon’s list of security threats. Similarly, one 
would expect scholars working on the politics of UK social housing to have greater 
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traction now than in the past owing to the tragedy of the Grenfell Tower fire, which 
killed at least 71 people in June 2017. 
Secondly, as Peter John has written, there are no guarantees that policymakers will act 
upon or even listen to the advice given to them, regardless of how convincing or 
strenuously argued it is, while much research does not easily lend itself to 
straightforward policy prescription in any case. Even when it does, though, academics 
are but one of many voices competing for their attention (John, 2013: 169). Policy 
advocacy is a dog-eat-dog environment, dominated by think tanks, media 
organisations, and professional associations who are inherently closer to policymakers 
than academics, and who have been perfecting the art of lobbying government for 
decades, often backed by considerable corporate investment (Stoker, 2015: 24). As 
Gerry Stoker has explained – unlike political scientists who want to make their work 
as robust as possible, dotting every ‘i’ and crossing every ‘t’, and therefore operate 
with an elastic view of time – these rival groups are set up to produce results as 
quickly as possible, which is often favoured by policymakers who do not have the 
luxury of waiting, or perhaps even the inclination (Stoker, 2015: 24).  
Policymakers and practitioners have their own vested and personal interests, 
evidenced, for example, by the way many politicians transition onto the boards of 
various companies, perhaps most notably in the arms industry and the financial sector. 
It is often said that they have a propensity to seek out expert knowledge only when it 
fits their agenda or existing worldview, and have little time for those who look to 
speak truth to power. ‘Politicians’, Ronald Rogowski has written, ‘prefer policies 
(often put forward by charlatans) that better suit their interests, and seek to suppress 
or ignore evidence-based research that contradicts their own, or their ‘base voters’, 
ideologies. When these same politicians assert piously that political science offers no 
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policy-relevant research, what they really mean is that it offers no research that 
supports their own biases’ (Rogowski, 2013: 216). Assuming – for the sake of 
argument – that an academic has the stroke of good fortune to have the right research 
at the right time; defeats the competition from policy wonks; and is a messenger that 
public servants take heed; as Dunleavy has argued, in such a complicated and 
inherently multi-causal political world, can he or she really claim that their particular 
piece of research was unambiguously ‘the difference that made the difference’ in 
leading policymakers to chart a new course (Dunleavy, 2012)? The honest answer is 
‘no’.  
Thirdly, there is also the problem that any model of impact that measures the outcome 
rather than the process sets academics up to fail, since it ignores the fact that politics 
is constantly in flux. A week is famously a long time in politics. As the urbane Sir 
Humphrey in Yes Minister was fond of pointing out, over-excited ministers and their 
policies come and go. It is not inconceivable that, in the period between the REF 
census date and the impact case study actually being read by the sub-panel, policy 
will have moved on or been abandoned, meaning that any claim of direct change will 
be false and look stupid. Imagine, for example, a case study, submitted in 2020, 
showing that academic research had been instrumental in convincing the government 
of the day to change its position on Brexit, to pursue a ‘soft’ rather than ‘hard’ option. 
Perhaps it even features a letter from an appreciative Theresa May, confirming her 
volte-face. What, then, if during the case study being assessed, the terms of Britain’s 
exit from the European Union are suddenly renegotiated? What, as some 
commentators still predict, Brexit collapses? Tough luck presumably – ungraded – 
unless subpanels proceed with fingers in their ears, not listening to the real world of 
politics, until the grading has been completed.  
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By setting the bar at the level of auditable change, which is difficult to determine and 
evidence, rather than auditable knowledge transfer, HEFCE actually risks 
undermining its core objective of promoting research with positive real-world 
application. To meet expectations of demonstrating direct public utility, which is 
inherently intangible, there is growing tendency for academics to hold fellowships in 
government, as ‘researchers-in-residence’, in order to generate impact testimonials.  
Problematically, it could be argued that such positions confine academics to the 
everyday grindstone of public administration, when their true value lies in shaping the 
wider climate of ideas that frames policy. Put another way, it is like asking Mary 
Berry to make sausage rolls in Greggs. As Dunleavy has claimed, there is also the 
danger that academics will construct ‘fairytales of influence’ (Dunleavy, 2012), 
loading their case studies with obfuscating proxy metrics like citation figures and 
‘impact factors’ which, by nature, are baffling and alienating to outsiders. Who in the 
outside world would be impressed by a Thomson Reuters Journal Impact Factor of 
9.216 (Barcan, 2013: 96)? Sadly, all political scientists would! Anecdotally, it has 
been reported that for REF2014 some departments employed professional writers and 
journalists to ‘sex up’ case studies that were light of decisive evidence. Since then, 
there has been a proliferation of workshops offered by university impact officers, as 
well as corporate bodies charging hefty fees, to help academics better craft their 
impact narratives. The fear here is that unless subpanels spot the window-dressing, 
the reward will go to the best storytellers, not necessarily the most impactful cases.  
Perhaps more worryingly, as Diane Stone and Tim Legrand discuss in this special 
issue, there is the danger of instrumentality that would see academics turn their back 
on blue skies research, where the social value might be nebulous at first but 
significant in the longer-term, in favour of more mundane and less risky projects that 
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have a greater likelihood of yielding a measurable end product within the current REF 
reporting period (typically a 5-6 year timeframe). Research Councils UK (RCUK) 
already imposes on academics a degree of instrumentality with the inclusion of 
‘pathways to impact’ sections in funding applications. The danger of this is that 
impact frames the very way research projects are constructed, with ‘hoped for’ 
outcomes shaping approaches, methodologies, and strategies. Projects, in effect, 
become loaded from the start, serving to confirm anticipated results, rather than 
fostering a more open-ended approach to research outcomes. The idea of having to 
chase ‘easy wins’ (Lawson and Sayers, 2016: 18), based on short-term cost benefit 
analysis, is understandably something about which political scientists are 
uncomfortable. The discipline can boast many examples of important contributions 
beyond the university context – think James C. Scott’s work on subaltern politics and 
resistance or Aaron Wildavsky’s analysis of public policy and budgeting – but these 
transformative impacts were not predetermined and ‘trickled down’ (Stoker, 2015: 
25) into society over time. Research, let alone impact, is a probabilistic business: 
results are not guaranteed.  
Concerns about the conceptualisation of impact have not fallen on deaf ears. 
Reporting in July 2016, the Independent Review of the REF, chaired by Lord 
Nicholas Stern, the President of the British Academy, argued in favour of moving 
away from a narrow and ‘hard’ definition of impact, typically associated with 
demonstrable change in the policy arena, towards a broader and ‘softer’ model that 
recognises the wider benefits of research on society, including influence on civic 
debate, cultural life, plus public engagement and understanding. There is little 
doubting that this would be welcomed by the discipline; political scientists have long 
championed that impact can mean different things for different researchers and sub-
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disciplines and that the ‘one size fits all’ model used in REF2014 penalized those 
whose research was less adaptable to applied operationalization to policy and whose 
‘impact’ is achieved through a web of influence as opposed to a linear progression. 
One of the interesting discussions at the PAIS Impact Conference was whether a 
broader understanding of impact would allow for case studies of ‘heroic failure’. 
Numerous examples were relayed of researchers investing enormous amounts of time 
and energy in cultivating stakeholder relations, only to reach a dead end, thwarted by 
forces beyond their control. Under REF2014 parameters, which hinge on a ‘but 
for/because of’ model of causation, these efforts go to waste. Would it not be fairer, 
therefore, as Stern seems to be recommending, to reward the dialogue with end users 
as much as the deliverable?  
At the time of this special issue entering production, it seems almost certain that 
impact will have a broader benchmark in the next REF. Departments, however, will 
need to look closely at the detail. Suspicions are likely to exist as to whether broad 
level impacts leading to a more informed citizenry will rate as highly as narrow 
impact on government policy, especially as impacts on public understanding and 
culture are notoriously difficult to capture and evidence. Believing that there is a gold, 
silver, and bronze standard, and that the notion of broadening is a bit of false promise, 
some departments may decide to play it safe and continue to submit instrumentalized 
case studies that are geared towards policy work. Indeed, our experience is that while 
almost all REF information and training sessions start off emphasising a broader 
approach to impact, they invariably end up concentrating on gold standard policy 
change. Admittedly, this is not so much a problem with HEFCE impact rules, as with 
the internalised perceptions of impact by academics and university administrators. 
Notwithstanding this, the harsh reality is that policy change is tangible in a way that 
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wider notions of impact sadly are not. By virtue of their location, plus historical ties to 
Westminster and Whitehall, it could be argued that this gives the Golden Triangle of 
Oxford, Cambridge, and London an advantage, or at least a head start, relative to 
institutions in other parts of the country. To our knowledge, the uneven geography of 
impact networks is an issue that has not entered any of the discussions of the REF 
Review Group, which is disappointing.  
In scoring the impact element of the REF submissions, the Subpanel for Politics and 
International Studies will need to make delicate judgments about whether HEFCE’s 
guidelines should be followed to the letter. In REF2014, it is interesting to note that 
the impact component was scored systematically higher for most submissions, thus 
allowing departments to boast an overall Grade Point Average (GPA) profile that was 
markedly better than their performance on outputs. 45 of the 56 institutions that 
submitted a return to the Politics and International Studies Unit of Assessment 
achieved scores for impact that were higher than their overall GPA score. The data for 
the ‘Big Five’ departments as named by the PSA in the immediate aftermath of the 
REF2014 results is particularly revealing. Within this sample, there is a significant 
gap between the scores that were awarded for impact and the overall profile. In 
ascending order, these gaps were 4.52% for Essex; 4.75% for the LSE; 6.17% for 
UCL; 9.72% for Warwick; and 16.83% for Oxford. Reworking these figures as a 
global average for the ‘Big Five’ departments combined, the gap between the scores 
was 8.41%. Even more striking is the gap between the scores that were awarded for 
impact and the scores that were awarded for outputs. Again in ascending order, they 
were 8.28% for Essex; 9.45% for the LSE; 11.19% for UCL; 20.32% for Warwick; 
and 30.73% for Oxford. Averaged, the gap between the scores for impact and the 
scores for outputs was 15.66%. Tentatively, one can draw from this that the Subpanel 
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did a good job in defending the profession when it came to grading impact. Indeed, 
there seems to be prima facie evidence that the crossbars used by the Subpanel were 
not those implied by a literal reading of the excessively demanding criteria set by 
HEFCE. One hopes that Subpanel representatives will adopt a similarly supportive 
stance in REF2021.    
 
The Politics of Impact  
Underpinning a number of the points made in the previous section is a concern that 
the REF impact agenda is politically and ethically naïve. This naiveté, we would 
contend, is a function of the ‘one size fits all’ approach, of trying to establish a 
common metric to evaluate research across a broad range of academic fields. Thus, 
while it seems relatively straightforward to determine (and evaluate) the impact of 
advances in the field of medical science, where notions and measures of progress and 
positive change are relatively uncontentious, in the realms of (international) politics 
and social policy that are the primary concern of political scientists, things are less 
clear and potentially much more problematic, politically and ethically. Accordingly, 
the HEFCE definition of impact as research that has had ‘an effect on, change or 
benefit to the economy, society, culture, public policy or services, health, the 
environment or quality of life, beyond academia’ is worth reflecting on. 
A key problem is that notions of ‘effect on, change or benefit to’ may not always be 
in alignment, since it is certainly possible to effect and change without necessarily 
benefitting society. In this respect, HEFCE guidelines also steer clear of engaging 
with the politics of the relevant constituencies/stakeholders of different forms of 
academic research. Society appears in HEFCE documents as largely undifferentiated 
and possessing unified purposes, whereas as every first year undergraduate of 
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political science knows, politics is about the often intense debates over the 
distribution of resources between groups: the who gets what, when and how. 
Underpinning HEFCE rhetoric of positive change, therefore, is what can appear to be 
a wishful and almost Socratic notion of academics taking us closer towards an 
unproblematic social ideal. As it relates to political (and social) scientists the impact 
agenda is essentially silent and discounting of the very nature of politics as politics – a 
social environment of competing interests, values and prioritisations. 
Ethically, therefore, political scientists are likely to ask whether all forms of impact 
should be valued. Under current guidelines it seems perfectly possible to make a 4* 
impact narrative based on research that has demonstrably had a positive effect on the 
ability of populist politicians to mobilise support and spread their message. Whether 
this should be viewed as a progressive or problematic effect of academic research 
obviously depends on one’s own political standpoint and view of a preferred social 
order. Anecdotally, having attended various impact training sessions, we are aware of 
highly regarded impact cases from the last REF that were in many respects 
diametrically opposed. For instance, a 4* case study based on research that was 
designed to assist large companies with public sector contracts enhance shareholder 
value and dividends by cutting back the services they had been initially contracted to 
provide, in contrast to a 4* case study that called for more public spending in areas of 
competence which some local authorities have now contracted out. Here, bizarrely, 
when read side-by-side, the impact of one case actually has limits on the success of 
the other. In REF2021, case studies relating to Brexit – a decision that has split parties 
and divided communities and families – are likely to be a touchstone for what exactly 
is the public good that HEFCE identifies. Would a case study demonstrating that 
academic research had successfully helped to engineer British withdrawal from the 
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European Single Market, to the delight of hard Brexiteers and presumably a healthy 
chunk of the 52% who voted for Brexit, be treated as a ‘benefit’? What about one that 
aided tougher border restrictions and immigration rules? The answer depends to a 
large extent on which side of the Brexit fence one sits. Clearly, there is a high-wire 
act here that subpanels will need to negotiate, but the bottom line is that fairness 
dictates that they must leave their own politics at the door and assess impact through 
the self-referential claims of case studies and evaluations provided by specific 
stakeholders. Imagine the uproar if the Daily Mail believed that case studies with a 
pro-Brexit position had been unfairly penalised by ‘liberal’ subpanels on political 
grounds.  
In instances such as this it is clear that HEFCE’s nebulous notions of research 
beneficial to society do not take us very far since at stake is precisely the nature of 
society being constructed and the interests of which stakeholders are to be prioritised. 
While it may be understandable why HEFCE steers clear of elaborating on what 
exactly it understands a progressive agenda or the public good to be – largely 
delegating this to the moral compass of impact leads and self-referential terms of case 
study narratives themselves – the very nature of the impact agenda may itself create 
incentives for academics to undertake research potentially leading to ‘easy wins’. In 
particular, research on circumspect short term projects, framed around positivistic 
types of research questions, hypotheses and methodologies with a potential for 
immediate impact might end up being preferred – at least as REF impact cases – to 
research on more politically contentious issues where evaluations of effect, change 
and benefit are inherently more subjective and therefore risky. 
Although political scientists might reasonably question HEFCE’s unreflective and 
uncritical failure to engage with the uncomfortable political questions that the impact 
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agenda raises about notions of society/stakeholders and progress/change, political 
scientists themselves might also only just be waking up to how the impact agenda is 
creating delicate political choices for themselves and beginning to politicise 
departmental politics. While many political scientists still see themselves as relatively 
neutral and objective observers of social processes, driven primarily by evidenced 
based research in line with their ethical commitments, the impact agenda has begun to 
create tensions with this view, and so far there has been surprisingly little discussion 
of the compromises they are increasingly making. In part, this may be because of the 
way impact has tended to be viewed (even amongst political scientists) as a largely 
technical and procedural issue calling for researchers to become more active in terms 
of communicating and disseminating their research. However, as departments and 
universities have sought to maximise impact it has also begun to take on more 
institutionalised and official dimensions. 
Collaboration and co-production of knowledge with end users are an essential part of 
building an impact case study. Gold standard impact hinges to a large extent on 
excellent stakeholder relations. However, as several essays in this special issue show, 
proximity to power for the purpose of impact brings risks and challenges that hitherto 
have largely eluded discussion. As discussed in the previous section, policymakers 
have a tendency to seek out views that confirm or complement their existing 
assumptions, which raises the spectre that academic expert knowledge is used not to 
improve policy but to demonstrate rationality in the decision-making process and 
underwrite and give credibility to entrenched partisan beliefs (Stoker, 2015: 21). In 
his contribution to this special issue, Richard Hayton warns of academics being co-
opted into the ‘Westminster bubble’, drawn in, consciously or not, by the seduction of 
privileged insider access, such as invitations to participate on government-
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commissioned panels, and the promise of glowing impact testimonies from officials. 
By means of a close textual reading of the case studies submitted by the top 15 
Politics departments in REF2014, Jan Selby’s analysis suggests that there is perhaps 
some veracity to this observation. Not one of the 43 case studies, he argues, 
corresponds to the criteria of ‘activist scholarship’; not one is undergirded by Marxist, 
radical feminist, or post-colonial thinking; none have titles that speak of 
‘confronting’, ‘resisting’, or ‘condemning’. Rather than slaying dragons, as he puts it, 
or opposing policy orthodoxies and established power structures, the majority of case 
studies are essentially mildly reformist narratives of political scientists working with 
end users, in a benign and non-conflictual relationship, to fine-tune the techniques of 
liberal governance. Seen in this way, the impact landscape is one of academics who 
perhaps started off with the intention of sweeping away the cobwebs of state 
corruption, malfeasance or failure, but who often end up notably conformist, co-opted 
and compromised to varying degrees.  
An interesting example of the hitherto underexplored ethical challenges raised by the 
impact agenda concerns departments increasing use of boards of ‘impact advisors’ – 
typically non-academic representatives from political circles, business and NGOs – 
who it is hoped might help them cultivate links with diverse groups of external 
stakeholders, providing easier access for the dissemination of departmental research. 
The University of Sussex, for example, has a Global Studies Impact Advisory Board 
and in 2016 appointed Yvonne Roberts, the prize-winning feminist journalist with the 
Observer, as the University’s first ‘Political Writer in Residence’. At Warwick, PAIS 
has an impact board chaired by former Secretary of State for Defence Rt. Hon Bob 
Ainsworth MP. Several matters can arise when departments seek to establish such 
boards and positions. Not least amongst these is the fact that people approached are, 
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by definition, believed to have access to institutions and people that are influential, 
and may also be viewed as influential themselves as a result of their previous or 
ongoing roles. Given the nature of our subject, this can mean establishing links with 
individuals and networks whose track record (depending on one’s perspective) may 
be problematic. Links with people close to the military, arms industry, or closed 
practitioner communities like intelligence may be an obvious case; but we might also 
think about people with ties to major corporations with track records of worker and 
environmental exploitation – or indeed, political parties. Advocates of such boards 
would suggest that these links provide an opportunity to close the gap between the 
policy world and academic researchers and, crucially, allow the latter to speak truth to 
power. Critics might counter that any such notion is naïve and that these links simply 
end up lending academic credibility to particular individuals and organisations.   
Relatedly, however, issues may also arise in regard to the personal politics of people 
on impact advisory boards and the extent to which their politics are deemed to be 
relevant to their appointment or not. In a context of rising populism, in which it has 
become clear just how out of touch the academy (including Political Science as a 
discipline) has become with the politics of a very large proportion of the population, 
there might be a good argument for opening up such advisory boards to a broader 
range of political viewpoints – even if those views are deemed deeply problematic to 
large numbers of faculty and students. The trade-off is that appointments like this may 
provide such people with an enhanced platform and legitimacy that comes from a 
University affiliation (even if that has become increasingly questionable). It may also 
be that the objectionable views of impact advisors only come to light down the line, 
with their having been appointed primarily for their technical expertise and networks, 
not for their personal politics. Of course, insofar as the personal politics of impact 
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advisors do not infringe any laws or University ordinances then these should be 
irrelevant. Moving forward, though, the ethical complexities of the impact agenda 
might make it incumbent on departments and universities to draw up terms of 
reference for engagement with external stakeholders. This will not be an easy task. 
Any policy would need to be consistent with extant legal parameters relating to 
freedom of speech and scholarly freedom. It would also need to be sensitive to the 
values of departments, however they themselves are defined, plus understandings of 
reputational risk. When appointing advisors, departments might be advised to ask 
whether the person’s politics or political associations are likely to compromise their 
ability to give objective guidance relating to impact as required by the advisory board 
role. Establishing ground rules on the appropriateness of impact bedfellows is clearly 
a grey and contentious space; but it is our view that the need to do so will become 
ever pressing not only as the demands for impact increase, but as universities manage 
their commitment to free speech in the face of a growing trend among some students 
for the ‘no-platforming’ of certain individuals on campus.  
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, this introductory essay has sought to situate REF impact within a 
longer disciplinary history and framework of political science. To date, the discipline 
has been relatively open-minded about the impact agenda – not least understanding 
public engagement to be an essential part of its remit from its earliest days. This 
position, we have suggested, has its roots in the discipline’s genesis and formative 
years during the first half of the twentieth century when key figures within the 
profession preached the importance of harnessing expert knowledge to solve real-
world problems. Indeed, for political scientists, intervening in the marketplace of 
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ideas was believed to be a civic duty as much as a scholarly pleasure or pursuit. 
Although attempts to professionalize the discipline in the 1960s led to a period of 
pulling up the drawbridge to the world outside, by the turn of the twenty-first century 
a commitment to applied scholarship was again high on the agenda. As a species, we 
would argue that political scientists conform less to the stereotype of the traditional 
public intellectual, a critic who explains why a policy is ineffective or immoral, and 
more to the model of what David Dresner calls the ‘thought leader’, a creator who has 
positive ideas for change and is determined to make a difference (Dresner, 2017). 
Nevertheless, important questions about impact remain. Some of these, we have 
argued, concern how it is presently conceptualised and measured within REF and 
where the notion of a ‘gold standard’ connected to auditable change places an 
emphasis on the policy realm. A positive reading of the ‘but for/because of’ model of 
impact is that it might discourage political scientists from becoming world-weary 
residents in a metaphorical ‘Grand Hotel Abyss’ – the phrase coined by Hungarian 
Marxist György Lukács to describe the thinkers of the Frankfurt School who, he 
claimed, engaged in comfortable armchair philosophizing about the unfolding 
catastrophe of monopoly capitalism and its destruction of the human spirit, all the 
while cocooned, doing nothing practical to stop it (Jeffries, 2017). A less charitable 
reading, however, is that auditable policy change is not only unrealistic, but also 
potentially retrograde in its failure to understand the nature of the decisionmaking 
process, let alone the nature of much disciplinary research that simply does not 
translate well into clear policy recommendations. As discussed, policymaking is the 
result of a complex and at times chaotic interplay between different actors, networks, 
and institutions, each with their own politics and path-dependencies, meaning that it is 
hard for anyone from any field to have direct influence on policy. Moreover, at a time 
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when the value of the ‘expert’ has seemingly declined and the feedstock of social and 
political life is a mishmash of fake news, alternative facts, and post-truth politics, it 
might be argued that it has never been harder for academics to influence policy in the 
manner gold-standard impact demands. Furthermore, ironically, the best evidence to 
demonstrate ‘but for/because of’ policy change comes from statistical correlations and 
the number crunching of data sets – precisely the kind of alienating esoteric scientism 
that political science has rebelled against as a barrier to public relevance and which, 
one suspects, flies in the face of everything the impact agenda seeks to achieve.  
Alarmingly, there is at least anecdotal evidence of the impact agenda impacting on the 
nature of the research process, which should be sacrosanct. This is no less evident 
than in how ‘pathways to impact’ need to be written into RCUK funding applications. 
Inevitably, this plays a disciplining role in terms of shaping the questions, approaches, 
methodologies and strategies researchers are liable to adopt. In this respect, any move 
towards a broader and looser conception of impact more in line with Putnam’s 
emphasis on political science’s ability to raise new and challenging questions and 
highlight underpinning logics and ignored values – as opposed to a narrower focus on 
providing answers to discreet questions – can only be welcomed. It is essential that 
political scientists remain resolute in defending the critical ethos that underpins much 
of the discipline. One way of doing so will be to have the courage to avoid the 
temptation of ‘playing safe’ and, in the forthcoming REF, be open to submitting a 
broader range of case studies (including heroic failures) that better reflects the full 
breadth of the discipline. In writing our case studies, we should also not capitulate to 
the tactics of advertising gurus who hold that evidence and analysis are insufficient, 
and that facts have to be sold as well as told.  
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Finally, there are important questions relating to the politics and ethics of impact. 
Some of these questions go to the very heart of the impact agenda where issues of 
positive change, the public good and the public interest exist largely as empty 
signifiers whose use seems to preclude any real engaged debate as to what they might 
mean in practice to different constituencies. The questions, however, are not just for 
the crafters of the impact architecture, but also for the everyday practices of political 
science departments and political scientists themselves. Instead of viewing impact as 
a largely technical add on, an issue primarily of communication strategies and public 
engagement, there needs to be greater recognition of the compromises and tensions 
that the impact agenda is bringing into our everyday practices. In the absence of 
definitive answers, it is beholden on us to remain critically reflexive as a community 
about the political and ethical choices we face.  
The articles in this special issue speak to many of the points discussed above, but also 
raise further important elements for consideration and future debate. The first five 
articles address more general concerns about how REF impact has been understood 
and received by the discipline. The first, by Claire Dunlop, provides a political 
economy-based analysis of politics and international studies REF2014 case studies, 
assessing case study submissions in regard to the themes of: who has what impact and 
when; impact’s beneficiaries; impact’s evidence base; and the challenges of 
generating and validating impact. In the second article, Jennifer Chubb and Mark 
Reed pursue a similar line of enquiry. Drawing on qualitative interviews with UK and 
Australian academics, they note that the desire to demonstrate the societal and 
economic value of research has raised questions about the unintended implications of 
impact agendas on the nature and quality of research.  
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In the third article, by means of a case analysis of electoral integrity in Britain, Toby 
James examines the types of policy impact that are possible within political science, 
as well as raising questions about the difficulties and dangers inherent to evaluating 
impact within our field. Overall, he argues that while impact is possible and desirable, 
it requires us to reconceptualise the nature of knowledge that political scientists are 
ultimately able to generate, one that moves away from realist testable scientific 
understandings to embrace how political science knowledge is socially produced and 
therefore liable to change and be adapted once it becomes known by social agents. In 
this respect, article four, by Jan Selby, provides an interesting (and sobering) 
reflection on the underpinning research that dominated REF2014 case study 
submissions to the politics and international studies sub-panel. As he notes, the vast 
majority of case studies lacked a distinctly ‘critical’ or oppositional component with 
respect to challenging established orthodoxies. In response, he argues for greater 
willingness on the part of critical scholars (broadly defined) to undertake impact, but 
also for research councils and departments to broaden their own conception of what 
impact is and how it is achieved. His rallying call is that ‘additive’ approaches to 
impact are all very well, but our ‘impact heroes’ also need to be seen to be slaying 
some dragons. In the fifth article, Sioned Pearce and Dan Evans then provide a 
historical contextualising somewhat analogous with the arguments outlined in this 
opening Introduction. Impact, they argue, is not as new as frequently depicted in 
debates about REF, but has a heritage extending back decades. What is new, however, 
is how impact has become embedded into core funding allocations to universities, 
with this raising important questions for the nature of research undertaken. 
Articles six, seven, and eight then shift the focus to more sub-disciplinary issues and 
concerns. In the sixth article, Richard Hayton considers what the impact agenda may 
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mean for the study of British politics and of British politics as a sub-discipline. From 
a period of having been on the retreat, he argues that impact actually seems to be 
reinvigorating the sub-field, with a striking number – far exceeding what might be 
expected given the recent general trend towards internationalisation of political 
science – of REF2014 case studies having a British politics focus. However, he also 
suggests that we need to be mindful that the reinvigoration of research in this area 
does not become focused on overly narrow issues. In the seventh article, Robert 
Dover and Michael Goodman discuss the implications of the impact agenda for 
Intelligence Studies. Although the clandestine world is secretive and typically closed 
to outsiders, they argue that achieving impact in this realm is possible, albeit the issue 
of how to record impact can be tricky when working with security and intelligence 
practitioners. However, they also note that intelligence studies is not unique in this 
respect and that there may be lessons to be shared with scholars working on other 
topics where confidentiality is also a key concern.  
In the eighth article, Diane Stone and Tim Legrand shift the sub-disciplinary focus to 
the area of public policy, but in doing so also highlight the extent to which impact 
agendas are becoming increasingly transnational. In this process, they indicate that 
general conceptions of REF impact in terms of how academic research can effect 
positive change represent only part of the picture. What we also need to be mindful of 
is how (social) science is fast becoming a site of interstate competition in a global 
knowledge economy. Thus, it is not simply that research is seen to inform public 
policy and that we increasingly see science being utilised in diplomacy, but that 
diplomacy is increasingly being used to enhance science (in the form of international 
cooperation and funding mechanisms). Moreover, such cooperation is also seen as a 
means of improving relations between countries. We can therefore expect that 
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universities will themselves place greater emphasis on ‘science diplomacy’ as a 
modality when thinking about research impact in the future. 
In the final article, Andrew Hammond, a former Andrew W. Mellon Postdoctoral 
Fellow at the 9/11 Museum and Memorial in New York, draws upon his personal 
experiences in the creative and knowledge economy to investigate the value of 
museums for political scientists, as objects of study, as collaborators in the production 
of knowledge, and as partners for impact. To date, he argues, the discipline of politics 
and international studies has failed to properly study or engage with museums, which 
is surprising given that they are inescapably political. Museums feature exhibitions 
that address, both directly and indirectly, political subject matter. Moreover, they have 
their own ‘politics’ and are often at the mercy of political pressures. Even in Western 
liberal democracies, processes of remembrance and representing the past are heavily 
politicized, involving a complex array of stakeholders, including governments, 
curators, museum staff, funders, and members of the public. Importantly, for impact 
purposes, suggests Hammond, museums are sites of memory that political scientists 
can look to embed their research, with the goal of influencing popular attitudes and 
shaping public understanding.    
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